


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NSC BRIEFING

9 November 1954

25X1X6

NEHRU's CHINA TRIP



- II. Nehru and Indian press cautious at time of departure.
 - A. Nehru "determined" not to let Communists capitalize on trip.
- III.. In China, Nehru got tremendous welcome.
 - A. Indians impressed by "spontaneity" of

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some demonstrations, solidarity of Chinese people.

IV. Effect on Indians different from that desired by Chinese, however.

A. Nehru, after departure, emphasized publicly differences in Indian democratic and Chinese totalitarian methods.

*Multilateral
+ potential
indications*
B. Impressed by China's strength and fearful of fact that India would be weaker partner in any formal relationship.

C. Nehru likely to be more cautious in dealings with China.

V. Major result of trip may be in relations with Indochina.

A. India may recognize Cambodia, though recognition of Laos and Vietnam likely to be delayed.

B. In conversation with U. S. Ambassador

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McClintock, Nehru said that he told Ho Chi-Minh if Communists sought to extend present holdings in Southeast Asia, they would run into trouble.

VI. Conclusions.

- A. India's foreign policy unlikely to show major changes.
- B. Nehru's increased apprehension for Chinese strength likely to work in favor of West.
- C. Visit may improve Nehru's attitude toward Western aid for Indian industrialization.

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